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vs. 
STAT~ OF UTAH 
<l'PFTY I\SflRANCE COMPANY OF 
_·:c.Llf-,~.p·:I.."\, a corporation, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
No. 19158 
This is an action by the bank to recover from the surety 
c·•rnpany certain sums which the bank paid to laborers and 
"aterialmen who were named beneficiaries under the surety's 
;;ayncent bond. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Up0n motion of the defendant, the Fourth Judicial District 
rnurt, the Honorable David Sam presiding, awarded summary judgment 
:sr the defendant, no cause of action. A copy of the Order of 
~'__.1'rna ry Judgment is attached hereto as Appendix A. 
RELIFF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
i·ht:' [' laintitt-appellant seeks to have the judgment of the 
I ,- I! rt t r_'\IPrSPi..J, and to have the cause remanded for a trial 
· ~ r I t S , 
STATFMFNT OF FACTS 
<·n •·r 3~.,,ut f'e>hruary 17, 1981, the defendant executed a 
"Subcontract Labor and Material Payment Bond", a rPduc,·<I L·.i / 
which is attached hereto as Appendix 8. ( p. : ) ThP narrit_·0 
on the bond, Valley Builders, was tr1c' [tlll"' '""trdct<r •n 
contract for the construction of a school huil<linij. 
Company, the principal on the bond, was a subcontractor em~ lc .. 1 
Valley Builders to do the masonry work. 
To provide financing for the completion of the project, AT~ 
Masonry sought financing from the plaintiff bank, and the bank 
extended a line of credit to ATM in the amount of $50,000.00. 1; 
15) As security for the line of credit, ATM assigned to the banr 
ATM's right to receive payments from Valley Builders. Not ice 0t 
the assignment was given to Valley Builders, but Valley BuilOers 
failed to comply with the assignment and made some payments 
directly to ATM and to laborers and materialmen. (R. 16, 341 
Pursuant to the terms of the contract between ATM and the 
bank, payments were made to laborers and materialmen to the exte1'" 
of the line of credit. ( R. 6) Because Valley Builders failed t. 
honor the assignment of the contract proceeds to the bank, the ca:· 
was not reimbursed for the payments made to laborers and materia.-
men. ( R. 34) The bank then brought this action to recover, trrc 
the surety company, the $50,000.00 which had been paid to labore'.· 
and materialmen. ( R. 6) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE BANK IS EQUITABLY ENTITLED TO BE SllBROc;i\Hi' 
TO THE RIGHTS OF LABORERS AND MATER I ALMEN, WHtlM 
IT PAID; CASES TO THE CONTRARY SHOULD BE <WfPRl,U.I 
Subrogation was developed by the courts of equity t1) Pnal·l· 
-2-
,,,rp LJ 1; r 1'1 t_ f. f, t l X rul~s of law, and to allow the equity court 
~IL~ 0 th~ ndturill Justice of placing the burden where it ought 
'c.! 1 ,._,cit u-,11 is [ l 1able and carable of being molded to 
·' 01r 11_.st 1 1:µ t<.· ccr"[.el the ultimate discharge of a debt or obliga-
t111n f"I tbe party who in good conscience ought to pay it. 
t<]lsta_te_ Insurance_ Co_. __ v_._1-'-'_i_e, 606 P.2d 1197, 1202 (Utah 1980). 
The equities of the instant situation are readily apparent. 
rte entity primarily responsible for paying the laborers and 
~aterialmen was ATM Masonry. ATM Masonry, in turn, was to receive 
those funds from Valley Builders. To bridge the time gap, however, 
tetween the receipt of funds from Valley Builders and the required 
;oyments for materials and labor, ATM sought a line of credit from 
the hank. The bank, for compensation, agreed to provide the line 
cf credit to the extent of 550,000.00 and as security took an 
assignment of the contract payments from Valley Builders. The 
~ank, therefore, undertook to provide the liquidity necessary to 
e~able ATM Masonry to pay its debts and perform its contract prior 
'.·)receiving the contract payments from Valley Builders. The bank 
~:0 net, however, undertake to guarantee that the laborers or 
•atErialmen would actually be paid, or to guarantee that the con-
tract would be completed. 
The surety company, on the other hand, did undertake, for 
",ersation, to assume the risk that the laborers and materialmen 
It is clear that, had the bank not been present 
1 ;nodct ion, the lal>orers and materialmen would not have 
i n.J, ilnt1 the surety would have been required to make payment 
.rsuilnt to th~ terms of the payment bond. With the bank in the 
-3-
transaction, the bank advanced funds for payments tu the' J ,,tir,rc: 
and materialmen, and was to have been reimbursed pro tant•, 
suant to the terms of the ass1gnmc'tlt, fr<lm V21ll•'Y k111l<lerc 
Valley Builders complied with the assignment, the bank would 
i"J' 
been repaid in full for the line of credit thus extended. Any 
laborers and materialmen not paid would have had a claim against 
the bond. 
The role of the bank, therefore, and the purpose for which 1• 
was compensated, was to provide liquidity. The role of the suret 
on the other hand, and the purpose for which it was compensated, 
was to insure against the risk of default on the part of ATM Mass" 
The holding of the trial court, however, would require the bank•· 
assume both roles. Valley Builders did not comply with the terns 
of the assignment of contract proceeds, and instead paid some fer: 
directly to ATM Masonry. ATM Masonry breached the terms of its 
contract and failed to use those funds to pay laborers and matena 
men. This was exactly the type of risk against which the suret; 
had agreed to insure, and the surety would normally have been 
required to provide payment for those unpaid laborers and matena.· 
men. However, because of the mistaken belief that Valley Builde:' 
would honor the assignment, the bank, through ATM, mistakenly ~a:. 
those laborers and materialmen, but did not receive the anticira· 
contract proceeds in reimbursement. To require the bank tn tru· 
bear the burden of ATM's default would be manifestly lnt>•Jt '' 
and contrary to the clear intent of the surety agreement 
In Paxton v. Spencer, this Court stated as follows: 
-4-
Tn hold the surety liable for advancements 
made or money loaned to the contractors to 
enable them to carry out the contract without 
the assent of a surety, unless the facts are 
suer that it would be inequitable to not hold 
the surety liable, is to read into the con-
tract a liability not assumed by the surety 
and a liability clearly not contemplated by 
the parties at the date of the execution of 
the bond, 
-1 Utah 313, 265 P. 751, 753 (1928) (emphasis added). 
This case comes within the above stated exception to the 
oaxton rule. The surety, and not the bank, agreed in consideration 
of premiums paid to insure against cost overruns and unpaid mater-
ialmen on the project. Had the bank not extended credit, no pay-
mPnts would have been made, and the surety would obviously have 
been required to honor its obligation on the bond, It would be 
manifestly inequitable to absolve the surety company of its con-
tractual obligation solely because the payments must now flow to a 
third party beneficiary, rather than directly to the materialmen 
r_1 r the na!1'ed obligee. 
The appellant acknowledges that there is a large body of law 
which holds that the bank's claim for money loaned to a contractor 
and used to pay for labor and materials is not within the coverage 
0f a bond which guarantees payment for that labor and materials. 
Annot,, Money loaned or advanced to contractor as within coverage 
0 f 0ond of building or construction contractor, 127 A.L.R. 974 
However, that rule, though old, is not sound or equitable. 
,1nal hasis for the rule no longer exists and the rule now 
,,JI as an anomaly in equity jurisprudence. 
Th~ early cases labeled banks as volunteers, and having so 
-5-
labeled them, denied them any recovery against the hond. The 
courts apparently viewed banks as having no obligation, con-
tractual, legal, moral, or otherwise, to pay the laborers and 
materialmen, and the courts therefore held that ariy [Jaym"'nt, 
by the banks were essentially gifts. see 12~ A.L.R. 989. 
The volunteer rule has been soundly criticized in G. Osboro, 
G. Nelson, and D. Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law 605 (19791: 
The limits as well as the rationale of 
the volunteer rule are a matter of dispute. 
It has been asserted that, whenever courts 
for any reason deny subrogation, they 
characterize the unsuccessful applicant as a 
volunteer. Even when used with more discrim-
ination it has sometimes been unclear whether 
subrogation was denied because the court 
found that the plaintiff did not intend any 
legal consequences to flow from his act, 
e.g., he intended a gift, or that his inter-
vention was unsolicited and therefore officious. 
A critical examination of the reasons offered 
for using the rule to deny subrogation on 
payment of a creditor by a third person has 
revealed them to be so lacking in force as to 
make reasonable the suggestion that, in order 
for such a payment to be officious, it must 
be unnecessary and confer no benefit. 
Because of the variety and unpredictability 
of its application, the voluntary payment 
test is of little value. Except in cases in 
which the payer clearly intended a gift, it 
should be discarded. 
(Footnotes omitted.) see also Hult v. Ebinger, 222 Or. 169, 352 
P.2d 583, 592 (1960) ("It is obvious that the modern practice '-'r.: 
permits free alienability of choses has robbed the 'volunteer' r 
of much of its rational justification."). 
Even if some aspects of the volunteer rule remain in efff 
it is difficult to see how the rule can e~uitably he aµ~l••'' 
instant case. Although the bank was not coerced to prov1d~ 
of credit to the subcontractor, the bank's payments to the la~cr 
-6-
,n,1 fl'ater1almen were l>y no means voluntary within any commonly 
.r.,~erstood meaning cif that weird. The case of Paxton v, Spencer, 71 
tJr' 113, 2fi5 P. 751 119281, presents a more reasonable application 
r t r1c \lr~1 unteer rule. In that case, Paxton had contracted to 
1 J,J a road, and had subcontracted a portion of the work to 
Spencer became financially distressed, and so Paxton then 
cttained a loan for the benefit of Spencer. Spencer defaulted on 
his contract and on the loan, and Paxton sought recovery from the 
bonding company. The trial court denied recovery, and this Court 
affirmed, The case is wholly distinguishable from the instant 
~atter. Paxton's loan of money to Spencer was not pursuant to any 
contractual obligation, but was truly voluntary. In contrast, the 
hank in this case had a contractual obligation to pay the laborers 
and materialmen, and the payments cannot be considered voluntary. 
A Utah case more analogous to the facts here is State Division 
of Family Services v. Clark, 554 P.2d 1310 (Utah 1976). The State 
had made payments to support children, and sought reimbursement 
from the fathers on a theory of subrogation. Similar to the bank's 
contractual obligations in the instant matter, the State had volun-
tarily entered into a statutory obligation to provide support for 
the children. The court held that the State was entitled to re-
cover the payments from the fathers. 
To the extent that Paxton v. Spencer, supra, and other similar 
·aces hold that a person who loans money to a subcontractor is a 
I ''''~er and therefore is not entitled to subrogation, those cases 
U\'f?rculed. 
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POINT I I 
A MATERIAL ISSLIE OF FAl'T C:XISTS /1,S r(I \•llr'THI-,); 
THE PAYMENTS hFRE vr 'I l'NT,\PY. 
The law concern in(_; whl'tf·~'r ,--i i ~/ll'l rit • , I 1r1 1 , i r 1 l :..., :, f" 1 
in 7 3 Am • Ju r . 2 d Sub r og at inn ~ 2 4 ( l 9 7 4 I 
Generally speaking, the party making 
payment is a volunteer if, in so doing, he 
has no right or interest of his own to pro-
tect, and acts without obligation, moral or 
legal, and without being requested by anyone 
liable on the obligation. A volunteer may be, 
but is not necessarily, one who has nothing 
to do with the transaction out of which the 
debt grew. 
One is not a volunteer within the rule 
here considered where he pays the debt at the 
instance, solicitation, or request of the 
person whose liability he discharges, or of 
that person's agent or representative. And 
one is not a volunteer, so as to be denied 
subrogation, who advances money to another 
for the payment of claims with an express or 
implied agreement of either the debtor or the 
creditor that he shall acquire the rights 
which the person paid had under a bond or 
other contract; and this is so even though 
the surety or secondary obligor made no 
request of him or had no notice of his 
advancing the money. 
(Emphasis added, footnotes omitted) See also Western Casualt\ ' 
Surety Co. v. Meyer, 301 Ky. 487, 192 S.W.2d 388, 164 A.L.R. c 
( 194 6) • 
In the instant case, the bank certainly did not "voluntari-
hand out money to the laborers and materialmen. The bank h, ,, 
checks to the laborers and materialmen at the specif11· r"' '" 
and pursuant to a contractual obligation with, ATM Masunt 
discharging ATM's obligation to the laborers and materialm~n. 
bank thus comes squarely within the scope of the abnve s1e•en 
-8-
, i was th L' r c· t () r f! n ( t 3 l untcoer. 
POINT I I I 
fHf HANK IS A THIPD-PAPTY BENEFICIARY OF THE 
I r1NTRAC1 . 
A person is a third party beneficiary of a contract if 
:~rtormance of the contract will satisfy a duty of the promisee to 
1C.e henef ic iary. Ke 11 y v • Rich a rd s , 9 5 Utah 5 6 0 , 8 3 p . 2 d 7 31 , 7 3 5 
il ~ J 8) • In determining whether a contract was intended to benefit 
'hP third person, the court may look at the terms of the agreement 
and at the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the 
e11reement. Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d 453 
r1 1tah 1981) In reviewing the terms of the agreement and in look-
1ng at the circumstances surrounding the execution of the agree-
cent, all doubt should be resolved in favor of allowing recovery 
'ender the bond, as a contract of a surety, for hire, is strictly 
c0nstrued against the surety. J. F. Talton Investment Co. v. 
''aryland Casualty Co., 77 Utah 226, 293 P. 611, 612 ( 1930); 
Ccnesco Industries , Ltd. v. Conforti and Eisele, Inc., D.C., 627 
'.2d 312, 317 (O.C. Cir. 1980). 
The surety company in the instant matter undertook, for com-
,ensation, to insure against the risk of default on the part of ATM 
Specifically, the surety undertook to insure against loss 
1 r·rsnns as a result of the failure of ATM Masonry to pay labor-
,,i m,:i.tE-'r1almen. The surety seeks to avoid liability by hiding 
1•, 1ua•ie in the bond to the effect that the surety is obli-
• t claimants, and claimants are limited to those having 
:~,·t C<'ntracts with ATM Masonry for labor or materials. The bank 
-9-
admittedly does not have a direct contract ·..ii th A.T'1 "·"'·' rir'i ,, 
obligates the bank itself to pnwi<lP L1'• t ,., 111,·it· r·l.,] :. n, 
bank's claim nonetheless cn11ie.·s w1th1n ti.•· t ~ I t l I 1 l [T 
intented to be covered by the bond, anll the Lank must t-;e ,:Je•·rcc. 
be a third-party beneficiary of the bond. 
A contrary holding would render the bond meaningless. Tho 
bond provides that "the Condition of this Obligation is such t'': 
if the Principal shall promptly make payment to all claimants as 
hereinafter defined, for all labor and material used or reasona:. 
required for use in the performance of a subcontract, then this 
obligation shall be void; otherwise it shall remain in full for 
and effect The principal did not promptly make payrr·e·· 
to all claimants, and the bond is therefore in full force anc 
effect, but for what purpose? Under the construction advocats: • 
the surety, the bond no longer has any effect, even though the 
principal did not make prompt payment to all claimants. If the 
bond is to have full force and effect, as required by its terms, 
the bond must be used to satisfy the claims resulting from ATM's 
default. To the extent that the provision that the bond remain 
full force and effect conflicts with the provision limitinlj "de: 
ants" to only those having direct contracts with the contract· t, 
the conflict should be resolved strictly against the surety. 
CONCLUSION 
The bank cannot be considered to have "vnluntar1l, 
money to the laborers and materialmen. The bank, l·y 11• n. ·t 
checks written against the line of credit, paid the l;it.orc>to c 
materialmen at the request of ATM Masonry, and pursuant tc• c• 
-10-
i,- r L..oa 1 ( ,:-, l 1-_:iatl 1-)n: r nicer existing law, the payments were there-
ri' r \'r' 1 u r1 tar'/. Ti; the extent that Utah cases hold that such 
1 t- ir" ·-· 1 luntar'.;, thnse cases should be overruled. The 
r: ;1:id ~.as is fr,r ttw vnlunteer rule has long since vanished, and 
• 0 ~ rule has no current Justification. 
Jn addition, the bank must be considered to be a third party 
•en0fici~ry of the surety contract, and thus entitled to recover. 
The decision of the trial court granting summary judgment for 
:he defendant should be reversed, and the caused remanded for a 
trial on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of Augu;t, 1983. 
/ -, 
,,_. :'- ---
/ -- ;:/.# / _.--_,-c _.,, <. - -7 
( S. RE*'i".EWIS, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE Or MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
·creg0ing Rrief of Appellant to Carman E. Kipp and Stephen r. 
"lchinson, Kipp & Christian, Attorneys for Defendant, 600 Com-
'•Prcial Club Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 1st day of 
; I,~ t ' I u 8 3. 
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>~I L~kt:_ CITY \JT<H 
IN THI: fSUFTH JUDICU.L DISTFICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
-----------------------------0000000-----------------------------
Vl!1S,C,TCH BA:-Jt: OF 
PLE1\Si\!'lT GRO'!E, 
c1 cur1-iuratic,:-i, 
VS. 
Plaintiff, 
SU'· ;::TY PJ S URAclCE COMP A.NY 
OF CALIFORNIA, a corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 62 ,023 
-----------------------------0000000-----------------------------
The Motion cf defendant, Surety Insurance Company of Calif-
~rnia, having cone on for hearing pursuant to notice on March 25, 
1183, with Stephen F. Hutchinson, counsel for defendant, and 
.s P ·x Lewis, cc,unsel for plaintiff, present, and it appearing 
t nu mater13l facts are in dispute, and that there is good 
1::s':-> therei: r, now, therefore, 
-1-
APPENDIX A 
·-it'~ ~>)llein for :-::;umrnary Judgment for no cause 
,1:..·l 1 on sr. _,u.ld hr:: and the same is h"='reby granted, with ~a.::h 
to bc3r its own costs. 
lJc.'~Lc.J this ~day of April, 1983. 
BY THE COURT: 
fl.~ !~~ ) 
DAVID SAM, DIST~COUR'T.°"J""u'°oo-G""E~-----
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